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Abstract
Events in Europe are impelling Americans to give European civil law systems more attention.
While commercial considerations are providing the catalyst, better U.S. law could be a by-product.
Americans familiar with European systems will recognize, as Pound did, the extent to which the
causes for dissatisfaction with the administration of justice in the United States lie in our peculiar
legal system. With knowledge of civil law systems, we could work better for the future that Pound
sought, one where our courts will be “swift and certain agents of justice” and the ”sporting theory
of justice” will be just a memory.
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INTRODUCTION
The collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union has created conditions conducive to a new study
of foreign law. The countries of the former East Bloc are
transforming state-planned economies into free market econo-
mies that will eventually join international markets. Suddenly,
Eastern Europeans have very real needs to study foreign law.
They require a host of modern laws to facilitate free markets,
and they need to understand the legal systems of their Western
trading partners. The American Bar Association (the "ABA")
is establishing a Central and Eastern European Law Institute to
promote this new study of foreign law and has initiated other
programs to help Eastern Europeans learn about U.S. law.'
The collapse of Communism is not the only occasion for
the study of U.S. law as foreign law. Most American lawyers
are not fully aware of the extent to which U.S. legal ideas have
been received abroad. In Germany, for example, U.S. law has
had profound effects on many fields of law. U.S. experiences
have heavily influenced German constitutional law, particularly
in the areas of federalism and the scope and review of constitu-
tional rights. The German Constitutional Court was in some
ways modeled after the U.S. Supreme Court.2 The United
States itself imposed an antitrust law on Germany during the
* Attorney-at-Law, New York, N.Y.; J.D., Cornell Law School; LL.M.,
Georgetown University Law Center; Dr. Jur., University of Munich. A version of this
Address was presented to the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York on April 16, 1990.
1. Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte, The ABA in Central and Eastern Europe, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1991, at 10; Exporting Democracy: U.S. Lawyers Help Eastern Europe Draft New Con-
stitutions, A.B.A. J., June 1990, at 18-19.
2. See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
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post-war occupation-the first antitrust law in Europe. Ger-
many did not reject the legal transplant, but reformulated it,
and introduced its own law in 1958.' Since then, Germans and
others in the European Community (the "EC") have studied
U.S. antitrust law as an aid in developing their own laws. Ger-
many introduced merger control laws in 1973 to complete its
antitrust laws, and the EC followed in 1990. Ironically, in this,
the 100th year of American antitrust law, antitrust laws may be
better accepted in Europe than in their original home. In nu-
merous other areas, such as product liability, environmental
law, franchising, and leasing, U.S. law has influenced the devel-
opment of law in Germany and in the EC.
Indeed, in Germany there is scarcely a field of law that has
developed without at least some attention to developments in
the United States. Rolf Stiirner, professor of law at the Univer-
sity of Konstanz, recently reviewed the reception of U.S. law in
Germany and suggested that U.S. law schools have become the
"Bologna of the present."4 Stiirner noted that in the Middle
Ages aspiring German jurists journeyed to Italy to begin ca-
reers; today they travel to the New World to study at a U.S. law
school or to apprentice at one of the giant U.S. law firms.
I. COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS COMPEL
FOREIGN LA W STUDY
In reviewing the reception of U.S. law in Germany,
Stfirner observed that there has been no comparable reception
of European law in the United States. The prerequisite study
of foreign law has not occurred. It is the rare American who
has studied law in continental Europe. U.S. law schools pay
foreign law little note. Present day proposals to deal with se-
vere U.S. legal problems hardly ever give serious attention to
foreign experiences. For example, under the heading of alter-
native dispute resolution, U.S. lawyers consider everything
SYSTEM 137-41 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing German constitutional court and judicial
review).
3. See ADOLF BAUMBACH & WOLFGANG HEFERMEHL, WET]BEWERBS-UND
WARENZEICHENRECHT 1210-13 (8th ed. 1960).
4. Rolf Stiirner, Die Rezeption U.S.-amerikanischen Rechts in der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR KURT REBMANN 839 (Heinz Eyrich et al. eds., 1989),
Much the same has been said for Switzerland. Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of
American Law in Europe, 39 AM.J. CoMP. L. 229, 230-35 (1991).
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from mini-trials to mediation to coin-flipping, but rarely look
at dispute resolution mechanisms used in Paris or Berlin.
More perplexing still is the antagonism likely to greet the rare
serious call for such study.5
The momentous events in Eastern and Western Europe
may lead to a lessening of American ignorance of European
law. The unification of the internal market in 1992 and the
collapse of Communism will require that the United States
take increased note of foreign law. The requirements of inter-
national trade will permit no other choice if the United States
is to be competitive. With the completion of the single Euro-
pean market on December 31, 1992, the EC will become the
single largest free trading bloc in the world. The position of
the United States as the world's industrial and military leader,
which it enjoyed in the years immediately following the end of
the Second World War, will have come to an end. The ability
of the United States to dictate to European allies will be gone
for good. Americans will have no choice but to negotiate with
Europeans as equals. The day when Americans could rou-
tinely impose their views and enjoy the application of U.S. law
in commercial relations, without resistance, will be only a
memory. Yet the need of the United States for international
commerce will not diminish; it will grow. As U.S. military
might becomes less relevant in a more cooperative and less an-
tagonistic world order, U.S. economic competitiveness be-
comes vitally important.
If economic developments induce Americans to study for-
eign law more so that they are better able to deal with foreign
legal systems, Americans should nonetheless use this opportu-
nity to learn more from foreign law. Recent events are likely to
make such learning more attractive. European integration is
likely to increase the intellectual appeal of the study of foreign
law in the United States. Europe's "civil law" may undergo a
5. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI.
L. REv. 823 (1985), criticized in Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure: A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw.
U. L. REV. 705 (1988); Herbert L. Bernstein, WhoseAdvantage After All?: A Comment on
the Comparison of Civil Justice Systems, 21 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 587 (1988); Samuel R.
Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MicH. L. REV. 734
(1987);John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Proce-
dure, 75 IOWA L. REV. 987 (1990).
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renaissance as Europeans harmonize and unify their laws. U.S.
lawyers less frequently will encounter different laws in different
countries, and more often find a harmonized or even unified
European law.6 Moreover, thanks to the United Kingdom's
membership in the EC, that law will now be in English, and
thus accessible to all U.S. lawyers.
Socialist law, once considered to be "different" from its
civil law roots, will now surely return to those roots. 7 The for-
mer Eastern Bloc countries will not receive the common law.
Their desire for association with the EC will impel them to-
ward harmonization with the civil law even if they had no such
background.8 The real question may be what, if anything, of
''socialist law" will survive?
European integration is also likely to divert European at-
tention from'the U.S. legal system. Europeans are likely to fo-
cus on harmonizing their own systems, just as U.S. attention
has long focused on comparisons of the laws of fifty-one sepa-
rate legal systems. Europeans simply will have less time for
understanding the U.S. system. Less attention may translate
into less patience with the peculiarities of U.S. law. Europeans
may challenge aspects of U.S. procedure and laws which they
find distasteful. Such a challenge has already occurred. Under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GAIT"),9
certain American legal procedures that block foreign imports
of patented goods were found to discriminate against for-
eigner producers. As a result, the United States must now
6. For Henry Sumner Maine, "one of the most singular phenomena" of his day,
dating from the French Revolution, was the "gradual approach of Continental Eu-
rope to a uniformity of municipal law," which led him to conclude that "Roman
Law," or civil law, was "fast becoming the lingua franca of universal jurisprudence."
HENRY SUMNER MAINE, Roman Law and Legal Education, in VILLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN
THE EAST AND WEST 330, 361 (1876).
7. Cf. John Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. L.
781 (1989).
8. The recent State Treaty between East Germany and West Germany provides
an explicit example. It provides: "The Law of the German Democratic Republic is to
be formed according to the principles of a free, democratic, social order governed by
the rule-of-law and is to orient itself on the legal system of the European Community." Gemein-
sames Protokoll i'ber Leitsatze, in BULLETIN [der Presse-und Informationsamt der
Bundesregierung], May 18, 1990, at 526 (emphasis added).
9. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. pts. (5) & (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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change those procedures.°
II. FOREIGN LA W STUDY SUPPORTS LA W REFORM
While commercial dealings may provide the immediate
impetus for the study of foreign law, learning for the purpose
of law reform is a more cogent reason to study foreign law.
The U.S. legal system suffers from serious deficiencies. Ac-
cording to former U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren
Burger, "[o]ur system is too costly, too painful, too destruc-
tive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people."'" The study of
foreign law, and of the civil law in particular, offers an alterna-
tive system that is worthy of a truly civilized people.
Perhaps the most famous criticism of the U.S. legal system
is Roscoe Pound's August 1906 address in St. Paul, Minnesota,
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administra-
tion of Justice."' 2 Pound devoted a substantial portion of his
critique to "causes lying in the peculiarities of our Anglo-
American legal system.'"13 Pound's address was an invitation
to the study of foreign law.
It should be a truism that any program of law reform be-
gins with consideration of how foreign legal systems deal with
similar problems. In the United States, however, it is not.
Here is not the place to relate the story of comparative law in
the United States, but suffice it to say that the coming of two
world wars that began in Europe did not promote interest in
European law as a source of solutions to U.S: legal problems.
Today there is no excuse not to learn from others. It
would be arrogant in the extreme to hold out U.S. law as a
model for legal reform in Central and Eastern Europe and to
refuse to recognize that other legal systems have much to offer
the United States. Indeed, the possible contributions of the
study of foreign law to legal reform in the United States are
numerous. As an indication of the scope of possibilities, this
address identifies a few concrete examples of fruitful areas for
10. See 55 Fed. Reg. 3503 (1990).
11. Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, Address
Before the American Bar Association (Feb. 13, 1984), quoted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2471
(Feb. 28, 1984).
12. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJus-
tice, reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964).
13. Id. at 275.
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study drawn from just one legal system-that of Germany. All
of the areas provide solutions directly responsive to just one
group of problems-those identified by Pound as peculiar to
Anglo-American common law. Pound's problems and Ger-
many's solutions are chosen purely for convenience. 4 Study
of these or other problems as handled in other legal systems
could be equally fruitful.
Pound identified five causes for dissatisfaction with the ad-
ministration of justice that he attributed to the peculiarities of
the U.S. legal system.
(1) The individualist spirit of our common law, which agrees ill with
a collectivist age.
Pound began in his 1906 St. Paul address by referring to
an article that he had recently published, in which he had ex-
plained in detail his view of the individualist spirit of the com-
mon law:
Men have changed their views as to the relative importance
of the individual and of society; but the common law has
not .... To-day, we look instead for liberty through soci-
ety .... The common law, however, is concerned, not with
social righteousness, but with individual rights. It tries
questions of the highest social import as mere private con-
troversies between John Doe and Richard Roe. 5
In the St. Paul address, Pound repeated his point that
"[t]he chief concern of the common law is to secure and pro-
tect individual rights. 'The public good,' says Blackstone, 'is in
nothing more essentially interested than in the protection of
every individual's private rights.' ",16 According to Pound, the
U.S. common law system has relied mainly on individual initia-
tive to ensure efficient government and the proper regulation
of private economic behavior. Pound concluded that "[i]n
consequence, the courts have been put in a false position of
doing nothing and obstructing everything."' 7
In the generation after Pound's address, the United States
14. Germany's is the Civil Law system that the author knows best.
15. Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosaphy of Law?, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 346
(1905).
16. Pound, supra note 12, 35 F.R.D. at 280.
17. Id. at 281.
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saw the coming of the New Deal and the end of the common
law's "obstructing everything." Today, instead of "doing
nothing," many conservative critics would say that the com-
mon law does too much. However one judges the common
law's effectiveness, the U.S. common law system still has much
difficulty addressing questions of social import, which it con-
tinues to treat as private controversies.
Questions of social import appear more frequently institu-
tionalized in the German legal system than in that of the
United States. A principle of social justice is part of the Ger-
man constitution-not as an independent source of rights but
as an aid in applying the constitution generally.' 8 Social limits
on individual rights are explicitly recognized in the constitu-
tion. For example, article 14 of the German constitution pro-
vides that "[p]roperty and the right of inheritance are guaran-
teed.""9 The same provision, however, also provides that
"[p]roperty imposes duties. Its use should also serve the pub-
lic weal."' 20 In stark contrast is Pound's quotation from Black-
stone, which demonstrates the individualistic concern of the
common law: "So great moreover is the regard-of the law for
private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of
it; no, not even for the general good of the whole commu-
nity. "21
The German concept of "social market economy" is a
striking contemporary example of "liberty through society."
The German social market economy looks to a free market, but
imposes controls to prevent individuals from suffering under it
and to protect matters of general public interest. Competition
is protected in a social market economy, in part, to provide a
limit on private economic power.22  The State Treaty be-
tween East and West Germany, which governed the currency
union of July 1990, explicitly adopted the social market econ-
omy. Article 1, paragraph 3 states that "[t]he basis of the eco-
18. See Philip Kunig, The Principle of Social Justice, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 187 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988). The German consti-
tution is known as the Basic Law.
19. Id. at 233.
20. Id.
21. Pound, supra note 15, at 346 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
* 139).
22. See JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTI-
TRUST LAW, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 (1986).
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nomic union is the social market economy as the common eco-
nomic system of both contracting parties."23 The few calls for
a separate East German state as a more "social" alternative to
unification went unheeded because the availability of the Fed-
eral Republic's social market model made unnecessary a choice
between socialism and unmitigated capitalism. Article 1, para-
graph 4 of the State Treaty provides further that "[t]he social
union forms together with the currency and economic unions a
unity. In particular, it is defined by a labor law system comply-
ing with the social market economy and a comprehensive sys-
tem of social security resting on principles of just reward for
performance and social equalization."24
The social safety net of capitalist Germany is better con-
structed than that of the United States. Only today do Ameri-
cans begin even to speak of comprehensive health insurance
for all Americans. However, such insurance has long been the
rule in Germany. Indeed, social security got its start over a
century ago under Bismarck.25 While in the United States the
Chicago School advocates a single goal policy for antitrust,
Germany clearly rejects such a limited policy. 26
Contemporary German administrative law provides a so-
phisticated system that seeks to balance the protection of indi-
vidual rights with societal concerns. German administrative
law offers many valuable ideas for the control and direction of
those charged with determining general welfare.27 Building on
French models, the German system furnishes a thorough, com-
prehensive, and largely effective control of administrative dis-
cretion. Two decades ago, Kenneth Culp Davis, the dean of
U.S. administrative law scholars, called attention to the advan-
tages of the German system and encouraged Americans to
23. Vertrag iber die Schaffung einer Wi'hrungs- Wirtschafts-und Sozialunion, in BULLETIN
[der Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung], May 18, 1990, at 517.
24. Id. at 518.
25. See GERHARD A. RITrER, DER SOZIALSTAAT: ENTSTEHUNG UND ENTWICKLUNG
IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 60-86 (1989). See generally WILLIAM HARBUTr DAW-
SON, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN GERMANY 1883-1911 (1912).
26. See MAXEINER, supra note 22, at 152 n.17.
27. These protections were further strengthened following the Nazi perversion
of the social side of law. In Nazi jurisprudence, the following maxim prevailed:
Everything useful to the people is right; everything that injures them is wrong. See
generally INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 68-81
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991) (discussing application of Nazi jurispruden-
tial principles).
[Vol. 15:1
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study it. 8 Not an American, but a common lawyer from India,
has followed up on Davis's suggestion.29
(2) The common law doctrine of contentious procedure, which turns
litigation into a game.
The "sporting theory ofjustice" was a recurrent theme of
Pound's. 3 0 According to Pound, it meant that "[t]he inquiry is
not, What do substantive law and justice require? Instead, the
inquiry is, Have the rules of the game been carried out
strictly?"' 3' Despite numerous attempts at reform since Pound
spoke these words-including the introduction of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-they remain as true as ever.
Among German executives, involvement in U.S. litigation
is considered a "traumatic experience," if not "a nightmare.
32
Stiirner, who is generally favorable to the reception of U.S. law
in Germany, notes that in civil procedure, U.S. law serves
chiefly as a negative example or "antipode" for Germany. 3
John H. Langbein, professor of law at Yale Law School, has
written eloquently on what he calls the "German Advantage in
Civil Procedure." He finds the principal advantage to be that
the German judge has charge of fact-finding. 34 This seems
particularly relevant in the United States today, as virtually
every meaningful proposal for reform of the American litiga-
tion system calls upon judges to be "managerial," and to take
more responsibility for the cases they handle. 5
Langbein's judgment may be taken a step further. Ger-
man judges decide cases because that is their task. They are
naturally interested not in the rules of the game, but in applying
the law, and in determining what substantive law and justice re-
quire. In these days of Critical Legal Studies and Legal Real-
ism, to suggest that judges should apply the law to the facts
28. See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
191-95 (1969). See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE
AND AMERICA (1976).
29. See MAHENDRA P. SINGH, GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN COMMON LAW PER-
SPECTIVE (1985).
30. Pound, supra note 12, 35 F.R.D. at 291.
31. Id. at 282.
32. See James R. Maxeiner, Book Review, 23 INT'L LAW. 321, 323 (1989).
33. Stirner, supra note 4, at 850.
34. Langbein, supra note 5, at 848.
35. Id. at 858-62 (discussing methods of managerial judging).
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may seem a quaint notion or, worse still, evil formalism. How-
ever, this conception is a fundamental tenet of German civil
procedure and produces more efficient and just results than
are usually available in the United States. 6
One example shows how managerial judging can be supe-
rior to U.S. procedures. Suppose a plaintiff in the United
States brings a case involving four different claims. Each claim
requires proof of four different factual elements. One element
is common to all, and the parties dispute it ferociously. In a
German case the judge will address the common issue first.
Resolution of that issue, which may be simple and may require
only hearing the views of a few witnesses, could obviate consid-
eration of any of the other, possibly complicated issues. In the
United States, the judge will not decide the one central issue
because it is an issue of fact, and will instead send the parties
off to engage in months, if not years of aimless, expensive dis-
covery.
(3) Political jealousy, due to the strain put upon our legal system by
the doctrine of the supremacy of law.
Pound complained that "the subjects which our constitu-
tional polity commits to the courts are largely matters of eco-
nomics, politics and sociology upon which a democracy is pe-
culiarly sensitive. Not only are these matters made into legal
questions, but they are tried as incidents of private litiga-
tion. ' ' 37 At a time when U.S. courts run prisons and school
systems, Pound's own example from 1905 hardly seems dis-
tant: "[We] have seen the collection of taxes from railroad
companies, needed for the every-day conduct of public busi-
ness, tied up by an injunction. The strain put upon judicial
institutions by such litigation is obviously very great. "38
While not always successful, the German legal system at-
tempts to separate legal questions from political ones. A legal
question should be subject to resolution without having to
36. For general discussions of German civil procedure, see generally Benjamin
Kaplan et al., Phases of German Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 71 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1443
(1958); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Some Comparative Reflections on First Instance Civil
Procedure: Recent Reforms in German Civil Procedure and in the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 609 (1988).
37. Pound, supra note 12, 35 F.R.D. at 282-83.
38. Id. at 283.
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value public interest, because the valuing of public interest is a
peculiarly political task. For example, generally in German an-
titrust law, questions relating to judgments of what is "compe-
tition" and what is an appropriate level of competition are de-
cided by administrative authorities that are politically responsi-
ble, and not by the ordinary courts, which are not subject to
political control. 9
The German Constitutional Court provides another exam-
ple of how the German legal system attempts to remove poli-
tics from the everyday functioning of the judicial system. The
Constitutional Court itself, of course, does decide political
questions. Few German constitutional scholars would ear-
nestly contend that the Court can simply and objectively apply
the Constitution to a fact situation, even though this is the goal
of German law generally. Nevertheless, the German legal sys-
tem seeks to draw constitutional questions, such as the consti-
tutionality of a tax law, to the Constitutional Court. The sys-
tem functions in two ways. First, only the Constitutional Court
has the power to declare a statute unconstitutional. When a
constitutional law question arises in the course of litigation, if
its resolution would require such a decision, the lower court
must refer that question to the Constitutional Court.4 0 Sec-
ond, the existence of a "case or controversy" in the U.S. sense
is not required for the German Constitutional Court to con-
sider an issue. Instead, "abstract" challenges to constitutional-
ity may be brought by one-third of the members of parliament,
by the federal government, or by a state government.4 ' Chal-
lengers need not wait for the legislation to be applied to a par-
ticular case.
39. See generally MAXEINER, supra note 22. This situation, however, may be
changing. See generally James R. Maxeiner, Berlin Brief-West Germany Amends Its Anti-
trust Law, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 3, 1990, at 1.
40. Basic Law, art. 100, § 1, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL RE-
PUBLIC OF GERMANY, supra note 18, at 277.
4 1. Id. art. 93, § 1, cl. 2, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY, supra note 18, at 273; see Helmut Simon, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in 2
HANDBUCH DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS 1253, 1265 (Ernst Benda et al. eds., 1984).
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(4) The lack of general ideas or legal philosophy, so characteristic of
Anglo-American law, which gives us petty tinkering where
comprehensive reform is needed.
Here Pound was not referring to some highfalutin "legal
theory," but to the very practical idea of law as science or sys-
tem. Pound addressed the U.S. bar just six years after Ger-
many's justly famous Civil Code went into effect. That very
month, Frederic W. Maitland gave an address in praise of the
making of the German Civil Code. Maitland called it "a great
achievement" and a "just cause for national pride."" 2 To
Maitland, Germany had set its "legal house in order," and had
"striven to make [its] legal system rational, coherent, modern,
[and] worthy of [the] country and our century." 4 3 The German
Civil Code was neither the first nor the last example of an ap-
plication of systematic, rational thinking to law that treated law
as science. Long before Maitland, common lawyers familiar
with the civil law admired it for its keen sense of system."4
In another address to the American Bar Association in
1912, Pound stressed the civil law's sense of system and noted
that
[i]f one doubts it, he has only to compare a modern institu-
tional book on the Roman law, a modern elementary text-
book of French law or a modern introduction to the Ger-
man code with the conventional Anglo-American text-book
of elementary law to see that we have no true system of the
common law, much less a system of the law that actually
governs."5
For one schooled in both systems, it seems hard to emphasize
this point too much.
While German students complain about the excesses of
theory, and there certainly are some excesses, there is great
value in systematic legislation and legal development. This
value is not given sufficient credit in the United States, where
42. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, The Making of the German Civil Code, in 3
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 474, 484 (H.A.L. Fisher ed.,
1911).
43. Id. at 476.
44. See 1 ARTHUR BROWNE, COMPENDIOUS VIEW OF THE CIVIL LAW (1797). See
generally MAINE, supra note 6.
45. Roscoe Pound, Taught Law, in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIrFH ANNUAL MEET-
ING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 975, 981 (1912).
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there is instead excessive concern with individualization and
extreme opposition to "formalism." Systematization fosters
efficient, rational, and equitable application of the law. It con-
tributes to making justice under the law equal. It also facili-
tates the development of comprehensive solutions to
problems, rather than providing inadequate answers in piece-
meal fashion.
Systematization does not necessarily mean codification.
Indeed, codification seems harder and harder to achieve in
Germany today. While there have recently been new German
codes of administrative procedure, and of building and plan-
ning, as well as a substantial recodification of the criminal
code, most observers would probably say that the day of codifi-
cation has passed. What the future holds for the EC and its
harmonized legislation is uncertain. But even if codification is
gone and the standards of legislation are not what they once
were, the fact remains that the general level of legislation is
markedly higher in many European countries than in the
United States. In Europe, there is a developing "science of
legislation," which provides guidelines in drafting systematic
legislation.46 There, systemization is valued and produces pos-
itive results.
Systematization goes beyond codification of substantive
law. It extends to the organization of law, including the deter-
mination of the applicable law and the competent decision
maker. For example, the United States and Germany are both
federal countries, but in Germany there is considerably less
confusion about which law to apply and which decision maker
is competent. In federal Germany, most important laws are
federal laws, although state authorities carry them out. Thus,
there is only one civil code and only one criminal code to ap-
ply. Each is federal, but in the first instance each is applied by
authorities of the individual states. In each state, there is only
one state court system that applies federal and state law.
There is no separate federal court system. The federal courts
are above the individual states' systems, and exist only to re-
46. For an annotated, selected bibliography through 1985, see von Eberhard
Baden, Auswahlbibliographie zur Gesetzgebungslehre, in GESETZGEBUNGSLEHRE: GRUND-
LAGEN-ZUGANGE-ANWENDUNG 187-201 (W. Schreckenberger et al. eds., 1986). For
developments since then, see the ZEITSCHRIF'r FOR GESETZGEBUNG, which has ap-
peared. since 1986.
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solve questions of federal law. Were the United States to have
such a system, a great amount of wasted effort would be
avoided in determining which law applies or which court has
jurisdiction.
(5) Defects of form due to the circumstance that the bulk of our legal
system is still case law.
Pound spoke on case law in St. Paul, Minnesota, the home
of West Publishing Company. In the 1880s West gave the case
law system a new lease on life when it introduced the regular
publication of opinions and a comprehensive and systematic
digest system. The problem was then, as Pound observed, a
subject of intense debate. John F. Dillon, a noted ABA presi-
dent, complained that "[a]n almost unlimited number [of
cases] can be found upon almost any subject.' '14 7 Some mem-
bers of the Bar, however, recognized a better solution than
West digests. In 1885, a committee of the ABA chaired by
David Dudley Field reported:
We can imagine a primitive society, in which a king and his
judges were the only magistrates. They had made no laws.
The judges decided each controversy as it arose, and by de-
grees what had been once decided came to be followed, and
so there grew up a system of precedents, by the aid of which
succeeding cases were decided. Hence came judge-made
law. But could any sane man suppose that this was a
scheme of government to be kept up when legislatures
came in?
48
Unfortunately, the Bar did not listen to Field's report, and
what appeared to be a flood of cases in 1885 is today but a
drop in the bucket. But once again, the salvation is West Pub-
lishing Company-this time in the form of a computer search
service.
This is another area where study of foreign law could be
productive for U.S. lawyers. Unfortunately, in the many U.S.
discussions of stare decisis and the supposed benefits of case
47. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA
243 (1895).
48. Report of the Special Committee Appointed to Consider and Report W1hether the Present
Delay and Uncertainty infJudicial Administration Can be Lessened, and if so, By What Means, in
REPORT OF THE EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 323,
348 (1885).
MAXEINER ADDRESS
law, scarcely a word is found about case law and statute law in
civil law countries. In Europe, since the Second World War,
there has been a very substantial literature discussing the role
of case law in civil law systems, much of which focuses on both
civil law and common law systems.49 While case law in civil
systems has yet to be formally recognized as generally binding,
scarcely a jurist in Germany would not acknowledge that case
law has achieved great importance.
CONCLUSION
Events in Europe are impelling Americans to give Euro-
pean civil law systems more attention. While commercial con-
siderations are providing the catalyst, better U.S. law could be
a by-product. Americans familiar with European systems will
recognize, as Pound did, the extent to which the causes for dis-
satisfaction with the administration of justice in the United
States lie in our peculiar legal system. With knowledge of civil
law systems, we could work better for the future that Pound
sought, one where our courts will be "swift and certain agents
of justice" and the "sporting theory of justice" will be just a
memory.
49. See, e.g., DIE BEDEUTUNG VON PRAJUDIZIEN IM DEUTSCHEN UND FRANZOSISCHEN
RECHT (Uwe Blaurock ed., 1985); JOSEF ESSER, GRUNDSATZ UND NORM IN DER
RICHTERLICHEN FORTBILDUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS (1956); WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER,
METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG (1975-77); O.A. GERMANN,
DURCH DIE JUDIKATUR ERZEUGTE RECHTSNORMEN (1976); O.A. GERMANN, PROBLEME
UND METHODEN DER RECHTSFINDUNG (1965); OSCAR ADOLF GERMANN, PRAJUDIZIEN
ALS RECHTSQUELLE (1960); Wolfgang Fikentscher, Eine Theorie der Failnorm als Grun-
dlage von Kodex-und Fallrecht, in 1980 ZEITSCHRIFT FijR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 161.
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